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The Public Trust Doctrine and California Water Law:
National Audubon Society v. Department of
Water and Power
Fresh water has long been a scarce resource in many parts of Cali-

fornia.' Judicial and legislative recognition of the essential part water
played in California's development led to the creation of California's
system of surface water rights allocation.2 In general, California law
provides for allocation of the state's water to satisfy the greatest possible number of beneficial uses. 3 Diverse and increasing demands for
this resource, however, have placed continual strains on the efficiency
of the system and have led to fierce competition and. frequent disputes
over water rights.4 While faced with the challenge presented by these
conflicting demands for water, the allocation system generally has been
successful in providing sufficient water to satisfy the consumptive re1. As early as 1880, the Calfornia state engineer reported that only one-sixth of the
state had sufficient water supplies to support a heavy population's water needs. See Miller,
Shaping California Water Law, 1781 to 1928, 55 SOUTHERN CAL Q. 9 (Spring 1973), (citing
Hall,Irrigationin California, 1 NAT'L. GEOG. MAG. 278 (1889)). Measurements taken from
1894 to 1947 show that 73% of California's total water supply originates north of Sacramento. Nearly 25% is furnished by the San Joaquin Valley region. Only 2% of the total
water resource comes from the southern portion of the state, the area that, by the late 1960s,
housed approximately 60% of the state's total population. Id. (citing CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF
WATER RESOURCES BULL. No. 3, THE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN 14-15 (1957)).
2. The law applied to disputes over water in California depends entirely on the characteristics of the water in question and the type of rights being asserted. There are two
generally acknowledged classifications of water supplies: waters on the surface of the earth
(surface waters) and waters under the surface of the earth (groundwaters). W. HUTCHINS,
SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 1 (1942) [hereinafter
cited as SELECTED PROBLEMS]. While certain legal principles are common to both classes
and to all types of rights in these waters, see text accompanying notes 133-34 infra, a statutory management system has been developed in California to regulate only surface water
appropriations. For the definition of an appropriation right, see text accompanying notes
107-09 infra. See generaloy W. HUTcHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS (1956)
[hereinafter cited as HUTCHINS]. Critics of this system claim that it could be greatly improved if coordinated management of all water rights in both groundwater and surface
water resources in California were initiated. CALIFORNIA GoVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REviEw CALFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 12-14 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
FINAL REPORT].

3. HUTCHINS, supra note 2, at 11. For a discussion of the concept of the beneficial use
doctrine in California water law, see text accompanying notes 133-47 infra.
4. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. A California Supreme Court justice claimed that
the California Reports contain "more decisions on that subject [water law] than on any
other." Shaw, The Developmentofthe Law of Waters in the West, 10 CALIF. L. REv. 443, 444
(1922).
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quirements of California citizens.- To accomplish this task, and
thereby enable the growth and development of the state, the California
legislature has authorized diversions of water from areas having adequate water supplies
to arid portions of the state for agricultural and
6
urban purposes.
Recently, however, certain deficiencies in this resource allocation

process have appeared. By focusing on providing water for consumptive purposes, the administrative allocation system has failed to provide
adequately for nonconsumptive or instreams uses7 of water best pre-

served by leaving water in the watercourse.
The conflict between consumptive and nonconsumptive water uses
in California is illustrated by NationalAudubon Society v. Department
5. Consumptive uses of water traditionally require the diversion of water from a
stream for agricultural or urban water supplies. Nonconsumptive or instream uses do not
significantly alter the location, quantity, or quality of a stream's flow. See J. BAIN, R. CAVES
& J. MARGOLIS, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA'S WATER INDUSTRY 16 (1966); see also Dunning,
The Sign~ficance of California's Public Trust Easementfor California Water Rights Law, 14
U.C.D. L. REV. 357, 359 n.1 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dunning]. Instream uses include
navigation, fishing, scenic and aesthetic enjoyment, recreation, preservation of rare and endangered species, and preservation of the natural character of certain streams. See generally
A. SCHNEIDER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INSTREAM WATER USES IN CALIFORNIA: BACKGROUND
AND ISSUES (Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law Staff Paper
No. 6, 1978) [hereinafter cited as SCHNEIDER]. This report was one of six prepared in conjunction with the Commission's final report. The Commission was created by Executive
Order on May 11, 1977 and was instructed to "review existing California water rights
law, . . . evaluate proposals for modifications in this law and. . . recommend appropriate
legislation to the Governor." FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. Six areas of water law
were deemed necessary for review by the Commission, and subsequently the six staff papers
and final report were published. Both the Schneider staff paper and the Final Report acknowledged that legal impediments to instream protection are a weakness in California law
and recommended that instream uses of water "participate equally in the present system for
allocating water supplies." FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2; see SCHNEIDER supra, at 2.
For an explanation of why California water law has focused on protecting consumptive uses
of water, see text accompanying notes 96-98 infra. See also Johnson, Public Trust Protection
for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 233, 255-56 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Johnson].
6. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971) provides: "All water within the State is the
property of the people of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by
appropriation in the manner provided by law." Other provisions further delineate the requirements of California water law and establish priorities in favor of municipal and agricultural claimants. See notes 128-42 & accompanying text infra.
7. Nonconsumptive or instream uses are defined in note 5 supra.
8. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 1-2. The terms "watercourse" and "natural
stream" are synonymous and refer to waters flowing in a definite channel with a bed and
banks or sides. I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 308 (R. Clark ed. 1967). While usually the
definition requires that the stream flow into another river, stream, lake, or the sea, the definition is flexible; a watercourse may exist despite the fact that it may not empty into another
body of water. Thus, substantial indications of the existence of a stream, ordinarily a moving body of water, will suffice to define a watercourse. Id. at 309; see SELECTED PROBLEMS,
supra note 2, at 6.
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of Water and Power,9 in which a coalition of environmental groups
sought to limit the diversion

°

of water from Mono Lake for use in Los

Angeles County. The plaintiffs in the Mono Lake litigation rely on the
public trust doctrine to challenge the Los Angeles Department of

Water and Power's right to continue its present rate of diversion from
the lake. The public trust doctrine historically was used to limit the
private use of certain categories of water to preserve public rights to

instream, nonconsumptive uses. 11 Although California law has recognized that the public trust doctrine protects public instream uses of navigable watercourses from physical obstructions,' 2 the doctrine has not

been applied to preserve a water level necessary for such uses. 13 The
plaintiffs asserted that the public trust doctrine logically should be in-

voked to protect Mono Lake because diversions of water may interfere
9. The action was originally filed in Mono County, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water and Power, Civ. No. 6429 (Super. Ct. Mono County, Cal. fied May 21,
1979), and subsequently transferred to Alpine County. Civ. No. 566 (Super. Ct. Alpine
County, Cal. transferred July 13, 1979). The Department of Water and Power then filed a
cross-complaint seeking a basin-wide water rights adjudication and joined as defendants
other appropriators and water users in the Mono Lake Basin. Among those cross-defendants were the State of California, the State Lands Commission, the State Water Resources
Control Board, and the United States. Upon being joined, the United States removed the
action to the United States District Court in Sacramento. Civ. No. 5-80-127 (E.D. Cal. removed Feb. 20, 1980).
The district court, applying the abstention doctrine, stayed the action and directed the
plaintiffs to seek a declaratory judgment in state court on two issues: the interrelationship of
the public trust doctrine and the California water rights system, and whether the plaintiffs
must first exhaust their administrative remedies through the State Water Resources Control
Board. Civ. No. 5-80-127, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 1981). In the subsequent suit for a
declaratory judgment, the Alpine County Superior Court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, holding that the public trust doctrine was subsumed by California
water law and that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies.
Civ. No. 639, slip op. at 1-2 (Super. Ct. Alpine County, Cal. Sept. 8, 1981). On November
30, 1981, the plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the California Supreme
Court, requesting that court to vacate the order granting summary judgment to the defendants, and to enter an order granting summary judgment to plaintiffs. National Audubon
Soe'y v. Department of Water and Power, Civ. No. 639 (Sup. Ct., Cal. filed Nov. 30, 1981).
The supreme court, on Feb. 17, 1982, issued an alternative writ accepting the case for
argument.
10. "Diversion" is an important term of art in the appropriation doctrine. It refers to
the right of an appropriator to take control of a quantity of water and remove it from the
watercourse. For a discussion of the appropriation doctrine, see text accompanying notes
107-09 infra.
11. See generally Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: Effective
JudicialIntervention,68 MIcH. L. REv. 471 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax]; Note, The Public Trust in TidalAreas: A Sometime Submerged TraditionalDoctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762
(1970) [hereinafter cited as TidalAreas]. See text accompanying notes 15-97 infra.
12. See State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172
Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981); People ex ret Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448
(1971); see also People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884).
13. See FrNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 111.
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with public trust rights just as seriously as do physical obstacles.' 4
This Comment focuses on the Mono Lake litigation as an example

of a major problem present in California's current allocation of its surface water resources. The Comment first outlines the development of
both the public trust doctrine and California water rights law, and then
describes the impact of the diversions of water on Mono Lake along
with the background of Los Angeles's claim. -The Comment concludes
that a comprehensive water resources management system, capable of
effectively allocating state waters under both the public trust doctrine
and present California water law, can be developed within the framework of the existing water allocation system. Integration of the two
doctrines would further the efficient and responsive allocation of surface waters in California.

The Public Trust Doctrine
Origins
The public trust doctrine can be invoked only with regard to waters that are deemed navigable.' 5 This requirement, as well as other
aspects of the public trust doctrine, are derived from Roman and Eng14. Complaint at 8, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water and Power, Civ.
No. 6429 (Super. Ct. Mono County, Cal. filed May 21, 1979). For a discussion of the argument in opposition, see text accompanying notes 167-71 infra. Most of the public trust litigation in California has involved land, typically where tidelands have been filled for
development with an incidental impact on public nonconsumptive uses of water. Professor
Johnson argues: "If the public trust doctrine applies to constrain fills which destroy navigation and other public trust uses in navigable waters, it should equally apply to constrain the
extraction of water that destroys navigation and other public interests." Johnson, supra note
5, at 257-58; see also Dunning, supra note 4, at 359-60; United States Closing Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant State of California's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water and Power, Civ. No.
639 (Super. Ct. Alpine County, Cal. Sept. 8, 1981). See text accompanying notes 92-94 infra.
15. The navigability requirement is implicit in the original purpose of the public trust
doctrine to protect public navigation rights. "[Until recently, the public exerted no substantial demand for the use of inland waters, other than for transport and, to a lesser extent, for
fishing." Stone, PublicRights in Water Uses andPrivateRights in LandAdjacent to Water, in
1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 203 (R. Clark ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Stone]. In
medieval England and in frontier America, people had neither time nor money to make
demands upon inland waters other than for commercial navigation. Id. Public rights in
inland waters developed in response to these limited demands. As a result, commercial
navigability has been used consistently as the line of demarcation for establishing public
trust rights over these waters. Id. Navigability has no single meaning in current American
law. See notes 31-34 & accompanying text infra. The navigability criteria for public trust
purposes are now so liberally defined as to be practically meaningless. Professor Stone asserts: "There may be an advantage in continuing to make that determination in terms of
'navigability,' . . . provided a modem, liberal meaning of 'navigability' is employed."
Stone, supra, at 216-17. The advantage is that the navigability test is a long-established and
flexible method of determining the suitability of the water for public use.
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lish theories recognizing the public's right to use navigable waters for

certain activities. 16
Roman jurisprudence developed in a society dependent upon the
sea for navigation, commerce, and fishing. 17 The Roman legal concept
of common ownership of rivers, harbors, public roads, air, running
water, the sea, and the seashore by the general population was established to secure unlimited public rights to use waters for these pur-

poses.' 8 Thus, private or state ownership of navigable waters was
precluded by common ownership; these waters were exclusively available for use by the general public.

In early post-Roman England, the monarch's claim of right to the
beds underlying tidal, navigable waters and of exclusive fishing rights
in these waters weakened the common ownership theory. 19 Because

most of the navigable waters in England are tidal,20 the monarch's
claim over these waters usurped the public's right of use. The crown

subsequently granted a large portion of its rights to particular subjects,
resulting in a proliferation of private rights and control over the majorand causing a stifling of public navigation, comity of English waters
21
merce, and fishing.

Public trust theory was developed to remedy this problem. Under
the public trust doctrine, the common law courts reserved particular
guaranteed rights or easements of use in the public for navigation, fish-

ing, and commerce. 22 These rights superseded all conflicting private
16. See generally Dunning,supra note 5; Sax, supra note 11; TidalAreas, supra note 11;
Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to EnvironmentalPreservation,81 W. VA.
L. Rav. 455 (1979). Because of the lack of evidence showing that Roman citizens had rights
to these resources, some commentators have questioned the significance of public rights in
Roman Law. See Sax, supra note 11, at 475. Traditional explanations of the public trust
doctrine's common law development have also been criticized as inaccurate. One author has
recently suggested that the "common law rule of public ownership of the foreshore-allowing public access to navigable waters-never existed in England." MacGrady, The Navigabili y Concept in the Civil and Common Law: HistoricalDevelopment, CurrentImportance,
and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.511, 547 (1975). Although their significance and accuracy are in doubt, the traditional explanations of the doctrine's pre-United States development were accepted and expanded by American courts, see,
ag., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), and are therefore important to an
understanding of the public trust doctrine's evolution in the United States.
17. TidalAreas, supra note 11, at 763.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 765.
20. See Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337 (1876); The Propeller Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454-58 (1851).
21. Tidal Areas, supra note 11, at 765; see MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the
Civil and Common Law: HistoricalDevelopment, CurrentImportance, and Some Doctrines
That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.511, 553 (1975).
22. See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-57 (1892). "Navigation" in
terms of public rights refers to general transportation needs. "Commerce" has traditionally
been defined as referring to commercial activity on wharves, piers, and docks going beyond
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rights, including those rights claimed by the crown. 23 Public trust protection was limited to tidal, navigable waters because these were the
only waters with which the crown interfered. 24 As a result, the classification of an English waterway as navigable, for purposes of imposing
public trust protection, was determined by its tidal character. 25 As
trustee for these public rights, the monarch could not appropriate those
waters for his or her exclusive use. 26 Instead, as in Roman Law, public
rights prevailed. Unlike the Roman ownership concept, however, the
common law public trust doctrine did not preclude concurrent, non27
interfering, private ownership of the beds underlying public waters.
Development of the Public Trust Doctrine in the United States

Early United States Supreme Court decisions incorporated the
common law public trust doctrine into American law.28 American
courts followed the common law practice of recognizing public rights
only in navigable waters, 2 9 but the common law definition of navigability, which was limited to tidal waters, could not endure in a nation with
great rivers that were navigable but not tidal.30 Therefore, the definition of "navigability" was developed to extend public trust protection
the activity covered by navigation. See Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park
Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976); People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal.
App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971). "Fishing" includes the "right to fish, hunt, bathe,
swim ... and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other
purposes." Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796
(1971). California and most other states have expanded trust protection by including more
types of interests. See notes 66-75 & accompanying text infra.
23. See generally TidalAreas, supra note 11, at 765-68.
24. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
25. See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892); Barney v. City of
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 443, 454-58 (1851).
26. TidalAreas, supra note 11, at 769.
27. See Sax, supra note 11, at 476. Although the common law easement approach,
which presumes private or sovereign ownership, is theoretically inconsistent with the Roman
concept of purely common ownership or "non-ownership," one commentator has noted that
"[t]his theoretical difference, however, has prevented neither co-existence nor confusion of
identity [of the two doctrines]. The Courts have never forsaken the theory of ancestral Roman law ..
" Tidal.4reas,supra note 11, at 769. By broadening the interests protected by
the trust, California and most other state courts are gradually returning to the Roman law
approach. As more and more public rights are recognized, private interests become increasingly meaningless. Thus, the public trust doctrine today combines Roman and English trust
concepts with changes wrought by United States courts. See id. at 769-71. For a discussion
of current trust concepts, see text accompanying notes 45-91 infra.
28. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 367 (1842).
29. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 43 (1894).
30. See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454-58
(1851).
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to non-tidal waters.31
In 1842, the Court recognized that the American colonies succeeded to the interests and sovereignty of the crown upon entering the
Union. 32 Subsequent cases established that the exclusive control of wa-

ters was vested in the individual states, unless the specific controversy

was related to the federal dominion. 33 States were thus allowed to ex-

difercise their sovereign powers to adopt separate tests of navigability,
34
ferent and less stringent than tests used in federal controversies.

In addition to committing the English crown's sovereign powers
over navigable waters to the states, the Supreme Court held that the
same restrictions that had limited the crown's powers limited state
31. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-37 (1892); see also Barney v. City
of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 443, 454-58 (1851). Three "navigability" definitions now exist in the United States.
Two definitions apply when a dispute arises involving federal dominion over state waters.
The basic test for "navigability" for federal purposes was first established in The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870), in which the Supreme Court stated: "Those rivers must
be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible to being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted
in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." Id. at 563. If a water course is
navigable under this definition, then the federal government has admiralty and commerce
clause jurisdiction over it. A similar concept determines the ownership of lands underlying
inland navigable waters as between the state and federal governments. In Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), the Supreme Court held that title to the lands underlying
inland navigable waters vested in the states when they entered the Union. .d. at 410. In
determining the right of a state to title of a stream bed, courts have added two conditions to
the basic federal test. First, navigability is determined as of the time of admission of the
state into the Union. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940).
Second, "navigability is determined by the natural and ordinary condition of the water at
.. .[statehood] time, not whether it could be made navigable by artificial improvements."
Johnson & Austin, RecreationalRights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7
NAT. RESOURCEs J. 1, 24-25 (1967). The third navigability definition applies in situations
involving public rights in state waters and is governed by state law. See notes 32-34 &
accompanying text infra.
32. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). States admitted to the Union
subsequent to the original thirteen succeeded to the same rights on the theory that the lands
acquired by the United States from the original thirteen colonies or from foreign governments were held in trust for the new states. This was done so that the new states might be
admitted on an equal footing with the original states. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212, 229-30 (1845).
33. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-31 (1894); Weber v. Board of Harbor
Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65-66 (1873).
34. See Fox River Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927). The states have
followed different paths in achieving control over waters deemed non-navigable under the
federal definitions. Most have adopted liberal definitions of navigability and thereby confer
rights in the public over these water bodies, the beds of which are in private ownership. C.
MEYERs & A. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 1037-42 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Mnvnns & ThALocm].
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management of trust resources. 35 As in England, the public trust doctrine prohibited absolute private ownership of trust resources, and applied to all navigable waters, unlimited by claims of right to their
underlying beds. 36 Alteration of the common law navigability concept,
however, extended trust protection beyond that provided by the English courts, enabling individual states to establish control, within the
limitations of the public trust
doctrine, over their non-tidal, navigable
rivers, lakes, and streams.37
In 1876, the Supreme Court held that state legislatures, in managing trust resources, could convey lands subject to the trust to private
ownership free of trust obligations. 38 The Court, however, soon reexamined the states' management powers under the public trust doctrine.
In Illinois CentralRailroad v. Ilinois,39 the Court upheld the Illinois

legislature's repeal of its prior, extensive grant of lands underlying the
Chicago harbor to the Illinois Central Railroad. 40 Relying on the public trust doctrine to affirm the state's ownership of the land, the Court
concluded that the Illinois legislature did not have the power to abdicate its role as trustee of these lands by conveying
such a large parcel of
41
trust lands into absolute private ownership.
Illinois Central established a model for judicial skepticism in examining the validity of legislative grants of trust resources. 42 This
35. "At common law, the title and the dominion in lands flowed by the tide were in the
King for the benefit of the nation. Upon the settlement of the Colonies, like rights passed to
the grantees in the royal charters, in trust for the communities to be established. Upon the
American Revolution, these rights, charged with a like trust were vested in the original
States.
... Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1893) (emphasis added).
36. 1d.
37. In California and other states, the courts allow private rights to be granted in trust
waters. See note 52 & accompanying text infra. Private ownership of lands that are "nonnavigable" under the federal law yet "navigable" according to state law is also common.
See Stone, supra note 15, at 206-08. Unless certain conditions are fulfilled, however, these
rights remain subject to the trust and the state may further trust uses to the detriment of
private uses without being required to compensate for injury. Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel
Dep't of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 420,432 P.2d 3, 11, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968). For a discussion of the conditions that must be fulfilled before
absolute ownership may be conveyed, see text accompanying notes 89-91 infra.
38. Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
39. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
40. Id. at 453. The grant included all land underlying Lake Michigan for one mile out
from the shoreline extending one mile in length along the central business district of Chicago-more than one thousand acres of incalculable value, comprising most of the commercial waterfront of the city. Sax, supra note 11, at 489.
41. "The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people
are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under
the use and control of private parties (in the above situations]. . . . than it can abdicate its
police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace." 146
U.S. at 453.
42. Professor Sax maintains that the significance of Illinos Centralis its illustration that
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model, followed by many state courts, 43 has resulted in a significant
check on state legislatures' powers in managing the trust. Although
extensive grants of trust lands are prohibited, the Illinois Central model
does not divest state legislatures of the authority to convey relatively
small parcels of trust resources into private ownership, or to make conveyances that furthered or did not significantly impair one or more
public trust rights. 44
The California Public Trust Doctrine
When California entered the Union, it succeeded to the trust rights
and obligations over its navigable waters, including the beds and shores
of those waters.4 5 Early California Supreme Court decisions examin"[w]hen a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general public, a
court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the
self-interest of private parties." Sax, supra note 11, at 490.
43. State courts, however, are not required to follow the Illinois Centraldecision, because, as the Supreme Court made clear in Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364
(1926), "the conclusion reached in [Illinois Central] was necessarily a statement of Illinois
law ... ." Id. at 395. For an analysis of the Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and California
courts' treatment of the public trust doctrine, see Sax, supra note 11, at 491-544. Professor
Sax also examines decisions in those state courts that have digressed from the Illinoi Central
model. Id. at 551.
44. The Court's holding in Illinois Central suggests that there are two separate instances in which legislative acts alienating the trust are proper: relatively small grants that
do not significantly impair trust uses of the resource or grants that further those uses. 146
U.S. at 453. In giving examples of proper and improper grants, however, the Court clarified
its intention to require that any such legislative grants be small in size and that the grant also
either further or not significantly impair trust uses. The Court explained: "The interest of
the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may be improved in
many instances by the erection of wharves, docks and piers therein, for which purpose the
State may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as their disposition is made for
such purpose, no valid objections can be made to the grants. It is grants of parcels of lands
under navigable waters, that may afford foundation for wharves, piers, docks and other
structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained. . . as a valid exercise of legislative power consistent with the trust
....
But that is a very different doctrine from the one which would sanction the abdication of the general control of the State over lands under the navigable waters of an entire
harboror bay, orafa sea orlake. Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that
trust which requires the government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the
public." 146 U.S. at 452-53 (emphasis added).
45. State trust management powers were traced to the English sovereign by Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409-14 (1842). The crown's trust
powers originally passed to each colony as "a trust for the community about to be established." Id. at 411. At the time of the American Revolution, "the people of each state
became themselves sovereign, and all the rights of the Crown vested in the states, subject to
the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the federal government." Id. at 410. Under
the equal footing doctrine, see note 32 supra, California acceded to all the powers and prerogatives previously vested in the older states upon its admission to the Union. See Pollard
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ing the nature of the trust, like early United States Supreme Court deci46
sions, responded to excessive legislative conveyances of trust lands.
47
In a series of decisions beginning in 1854 with Eldridge v. Cowell, the
California Supreme Court established the permissible range of the leg-

islature's power to terminate trust rights by conveyances of tidelands to

48
private ownership.
In Eldridge, the California legislature had granted lands within

San Francisco Bay to the City and County of San Francisco for harbor

development. 49 Citizens' groups concerned with the impact of these
development activities along the Bay challenged the grants as violating

public trust rights in California's navigable waters. The California
Supreme Court, relying upon the expressed purpose of the grants, upheld the legislature's actions as being within the state's trust management powers. 50 Thus, even before Illinois Central,5' Eldridge
recognized the state's authority, as administrator of the public trust, to
dispose absolutely of title to small parcels of trust lands when those
conveyances promoted public trust uses.
Later California cases departed from Illinois Central, however, by
v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229-30 (1845); Note, The TidelandTrust: Economic Currents
in A TraditionalLegal Doctrine, 21 U.C.L.A. L REv. 826, 832-33 (1974). As Illinois Central
soon thereafter made clear, California also acceded to limitations imposed upon state trust
management powers by the public trust doctrine. See notes 39-44 & accompanying text
supra.
46. Abuses and injustices in connection with early grants by the California legislature
are well documented. "IClounty surveyors unblushingly certified as lands above low tide
thousands of acres that lay six to eighteen feet below the waters of San Francisco Bay." M.
ScoTT, THE FUTURE OF THE SAN FRANcIsco BAY 4 (1963). In another situation, the Central Pacific Railroad bought all the tideland frontage along the San Pedro harbor in Los
Angeles County and required any wharf construction to be cleared through its offices. Id. at
9.
47. 4 Cal. 80 (1854).
48. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971);
City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970); Mallon
v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 282 P.2d 481 (1955); People v. California Fish Co.,
166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); People ex rel. Pierce v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336 (1864).
49. In 1851, the California Legislature passed the Beach and Water-Lot Act authorizing the development of a deep water port and appropriate waterfront at San Francisco. 1851
Cal. Stat. ch. 41, at 307. By further legislation in 1853, provision was made for sale of lands
including the areas challenged in Eldridge. 1853 Cal. Stat. ch. 160, at 219. These acts were
relatively narrow in geographic scope, referring only to designated waterfront areas near
seaport towns in California. In addition, the legislature expressly provided for the protection of free public access to San Francisco Bay's navigable waters. These acts have been
termed "special acts," as opposed to general acts, see note 55 infra, and have been interpreted to fall within the "improvement of navigation exception to the general rule that legislative transfers of public trust lands pass only title subject to the public's rights." Note,
Increased Public Trust Protectionfor California's Tidelands-City of Berkeley v Superior
Court, 14 U.C.D. L. REy. 399, 407 (1980).
50. See 4 Cal. at 87.
51. See notes 39-44 & accompanying text supra.
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holding that an improper grant by the legislature did not cause title to
return to the state.52 In People v. CaiforniaFish Co. , the California
Supreme Court held that the private grantee retains title to the lands
subject to the public's superior rights of use. The state legislature had
authorized the sale of tidelands fronting San Pedro Bay under certain
"general statutes" providing for the "sale of swamp and overflowed,
salt-marsh and tidelands. ' 54 When the state sought to quiet title to
some of the conveyed lands, the question arose whether the legislature
had failed to terminate the trust in these lands because the conveyances
were not made in conjunction with a specific plan to further the public
trust.5 5 The court concluded that tideland disposition statutes are to be

strictly construed and that "if any interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which would retain the public's interest in tidelands,
the court must give the statute such an interpretation. ' 56 The court,
however, did not grant title to the state; the court held that the grantee
continued to own "the soil, subject to the easement of the public for the
public uses of navigation and commerce, and to the right of the state, as
administrator and controller of these public uses and the public trust
"57

Only two years after CalforniaFish, however, in Knudsen v. Kear-

ney,58 the court departed from its standard of strict interpretation by

holding that an 1870 disposition statute 59 properly alienated public
trust rights over a large portion of the tidelands adjacent to the Berke-

52. Earlier California cases had held that title to tidelands was void or voidable when
granted by the legislature outside of a plan to further the public interest. Kimball v. MacPherson, 46 Cal. 104 (1873); People ex rel. Pierce v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336 (1864); Taylor v.
Underhill, 40 CaL 471 (1871). See generalo Comment, The TidelandTrust: Economic Currents in a TraditionalLegal Doctrine,21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 826, 837-48 (1974).
53. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
54. Id. at 582, 138 P. at 81.
55. Id. at 591, 138 P. at 85. Statutes granting or authorizing the sale of waterfront lands
in California fit into two categories: "general" disposition statutes and "special" disposition
statutes. For a discussion of grants pursuant to specific plans and why they are sufficient to
alienate the public trust, see note 49 supra. A recent commentator noted: "The general acts
were primarily designed to promote agricultural reclamation and to raise revenue for the
state through the sale of swamp and overflow lands given to the state by the federal government." Note, IncreasedPublicTrust ProtectionforCaifornia'sTidelands--City ofBerkeley v.
Superior Court, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 399, 403 (1980). Statewide in scope, these acts were
phrased in general terms and made no provision for public rights. Id. These grants were
characterized by corruption, see note 46 supra, and led to the enactment of state constitutional provisions limiting such sales. See notes 76-80 & accompanying text infra. Beginning
with CalforniaFish, private grantees under general acts took title subject to the public trust.
56. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 597, 138 P. at 88.
57. Id. at 599, 138 P. at 88.
58. 171 Cal. 250, 152 P. 541 (1915).
59. 1870 Cal. Stat. ch. 388, at 541.
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ley Marina. 60 Knudsen was criticized as inconsistent with the model of
judicial scrutiny maintained in CaliforniaFish because the provisions
of the disposition act contained few specific substantive or procedural
standards and revealed "little if any public purpose beyond raising revenue for the state. ' 61 The court in 1980 again had the opportunity to
consider a private grant made pursuant to the 1870 act in City of Berkeley v. SuperiorCourt, 62 in which the court reexamined both the 1870 act
and Knudsen.63 City of Berkeley arose when private tidelands owners,

claiming water rights under the 1870 act, brought an action to quiet
title to seventy-nine acres of lands adjacent to the Berkeley Marina. In
holding for the defendants, the court overruled Knudsen and reimposed
the public trust over these lands after examining both the wording of
the 1870 statute and its legislative history in light of the criteria set
forth in CaliforniaFish.64 The court justified its decision on the basis of
these criteria, stating that it had found insufficient evidence of "clear
intent expressed or necessarily implied" by the legislature that the pur65
pose of the act was to further navigation or some other trust use.
In City of Berkeley, the California Supreme Court expanded the
model of judicial skepticism in examining the validity of legislative
grants of trust lands that had been established in Illinois Central. The
court stressed the necessity of proving the requirements of trust alienation before absolute grants of trust lands will be upheld.
The Scope of Public Trust Protection in California
The most expansive development of California public trust law
has concerned the scope and applicability of public trust easements.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that "the public uses to
which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass
changing public needs."' 66 Conforming with this position, public trust
60. The court held that the legislative grants conveyed to the grantee all the right, title,
and interest of the state in the particular lot. 171 Cal. at 253, 152 P. at 542.
61. Comment, PrivateFills in Navigable Waters: A Common Law Approach, 60 CALIF.
L. REv. 225, 251-52 (1972).
62. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
63. Id. at 525-27, 606 P.2d at 367-69, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 332-34. See generally Note,
Increased Public Trust Protectionfor California's Tidelands-City of Berkeley v. Superior
Court, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 399 (1981).
64. 26 Cal. 3d at 528, 606 P.2d at 369, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 334. The court limited the
application of its ruling by allowing lands already improved or filled in reliance upon overruled decisions to be free of the trust. Only those lands still "physically adaptable for trust
purposes" were included in the holding. Id. at 534-35, 606 P.2d at 373-74, 162 Cal. Rptr. at
338-39.
65. Id. at 529, 606 P.2d at 370, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
66. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796
(1971).
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protection in California has expanded traditional trust concepts in
three ways.
First, the historical easements granted under the trust doctrine for
navigation, commerce, and fishing have been interpreted liberally to
include recreational uses of water. California courts have expanded
the traditional definitions of these terms to protect rights to "fish, hunt,
bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the
navigable waters of the state and to use the bottom of the navigable
waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes."6 7
Second, the California Supreme Court has recognized new areas
of public trust rights, thereby enabling California courts to use the public trust doctrine for environmental regulation. The 1971 California
Supreme Court decision of Marks v. Whitney 6 8 was largely responsible
for this development. At issue in this case was the right of a tidelands
grantee to fill and develop his property. 69 The court, citing California
Fish, denied the grantee absolute ownership of the property, holding
70
that the title to the land was subject to the public trust easement. Significantly, the court, in dictum, expressly broadened the range of public
trust easements to include uses not mentioned in earlier cases, acknowledging that one of the uses protected by the public trust doctrine is the
conservation of resources:
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important
public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands
trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that
they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space,
and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and
marine
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the
71
area.

Finally, California, following the practice of most states, has
adopted a liberal test of navigability, resulting in more comprehensive
protection of the state's water resources. 72 In 1971, in People ex rel
Baker v. Mack, 73 an appellate court adopted a recreational boating test
to be used in determining whether a body of water is navigable for
67. Id.; see also Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d
560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1976); People ex rel Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 448 (1971); Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951).
68. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).

69. Id. This issue has arisen in other public trusts cases. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v.
Superior Court, 26 CaL 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840
(1980); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970);

People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
70.

6 Cal. 3d at 261, 491 P.2d at 381, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 797.

71. id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
72. See MEYERS & TARLOCK, supra note 34, at 1037-42.
73. 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971).
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purposes of applying public trust easements.74 The court held that a

body of water capable of being navigated by pleasure craft is considered to be navigable and, therefore, is held in trust for public use.75
The recent expansion of the scope of public trust protection in California has corresponded with growing public activism and concern
over preserving California's water resources. Initially, however, legislative and judicial response to the early excessive conveyances of tidal
lands by the state legislature7 6 had focused on protection of tideland
resources. 77 When the constitutional convention met in 1878, the delegates enacted two provisions designed to protect public ownership of
and access to tideland resources.78 Although the first of these provisions, article X, section 3 of the California Constitution, is limited expressly to prohibiting the alienation of designated portions of
tidelands, 79 section 4 of article X has broader applicability: it guarantees the right of way to all navigable waters in the state whenever it is
80
required for any public purpose.

The application of the doctrinal developments described above relating to the public trust protection of tidelands and their overlying waters, however, is not limited to those waters. A recent California case,

State of Californiav. Superior Court (Lyon),8 1 conclusively established
that the principles articulated in Calfornia Fish, Marks, City of Berke-

ley, and the state's constitution apply equally to non-tidal, navigable
waters. 82 Lyon involved a dispute between a private grantee and the
State of California over the ownership of 500 acres of land between the
74. The public navigational easement or servitude has been recognized as separate
from the public trust doctrine. There is no clear line separating these doctrines, however,
and it has been suggested that the navigational easement is merely a part of the larger public
trust doctrine. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 233.
75. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 1044-49, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 450-53.
76. See notes 45-46 & accompanying text supra.
77. Tidelands are "those lands lying between the lines of mean high and low tide covered and uncovered successively by the ebb and flow thereof." Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d
251, 257-58, 491 P.2d 374, 378-79, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794-95 (1971).
78. See Comment, California'sTideland Trust: Shoring It Up, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 759,
764 (citing 2 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1038 (1880)).
79. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 3 prohibits the alienation of any tidelands from the trust
when they are located within two miles of "any incorporated city, city and county, or town."
80. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4. For discussions of the effect of the constitutional amendment on public trust rights in tidelands, see Martyn & Bohner, The Loss of Public Tidelands
to PrivatePartiesThrough UnconstitutionalLand Trades, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (1978); Comment, CaliforniasTideland Trust: Shoring It Up, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 763-65 (1971);
Comment, The Tideland Trust: Economic Currents in a Traditional Legal Doctrine, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 826 (1974).
81. 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981).
82. Id. at 231, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708; accord State of California v.
Superior Court (Fogerty), 29 Cal. 3d 240, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, 625 P.2d 256 (1981).
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high and low watermarks of a non-tidal, navigable lake. The California Supreme Court concluded that the private owner had received title
to these lands from the state pursuant to a statute 83 providing that
grants of land bordering upon lakes or streams extend to the low water
mark. Relying on CaliforniaFish and City of Berkeley, the court held
that these ownership rights were encumbered by the public trust,84 and
that "the same incidents of the trust applicable to tidelands also apply
to nontidal navigable waters and that the public's interest is not confined to the water, but extends also to the bed of the water."8 5 The
court noted that the private owner could use the land in any way not
incompatible with the public's interest in the property.8 6 The court recognized the expanded scope of these interests, however, to include preservation of those lands in their natural state, 87 an expansive
interpretation that effectively precluded the plaintiff's development
plans. 8
The California public trust doctrine thus applies to all state-defined navigable waters. While the trust over these waters may be alienated, any legislative grants purporting to do so must fulfill the
requirements for trust alienation imposed by CaliforniaFish and Ciy of
Berkeley. An absolute conveyance by the state is valid only if the parcel conveyed is small in relation to the body of water.8 9 The intent of
the legislature to alienate the trust must be clearly established, and the
primary rationale for the conveyance must be to further one or more of
the recognized trust easements. 90 If there is any doubt regarding a conveyance, that doubt will be resolved against alienation; the conveyance
will be held invalid and the private grantee's ownership rights will remain subject to public use and state control. 9 1
83. CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (West 1971).
84. 29 Cal. 3d at 226, 625 P.2d at 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
85. Id. at 231, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708. The plaintiff argued that the
public's use of the water for navigation, commerce, and fishing would not be reduced by the
reclamation and development of this land because the strip of land between low and high
water is uncovered only seasonally instead of every day, as are tidelands. The court rejected
this contention, noting that the plaintiffs description of public uses did not provide for the
modem additions recognizing a public interest in preserving trust lands in their natural
state. Id. at 230, 625 P.2d at 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708; see also Dunning, supra note 5, at
386-88.
86. 29 Cal. 3d at 232, 625 P.2d at 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
87. Id. at 229-230, 625 P.2d at 250-51, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
88. Id. at 215, 625 P.2d at 241, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 698. The litigation arose after the
plaintiff was denied a permit to repair a levee for the purpose of reclaiming and developing a
portion of the underlying lands.
89. See notes 49-54 & accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 55-65 & accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 72-88 & accompanying text supra.
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Public Trust Protection of Navigable Watercourses
Application of the trust doctrine to inland navigable waters creates
problems different from those encountered in administering the trust
over tidelands. 92 In coastal areas, the typical fill and development activity leading to public trust litigation interferes with both the navigable waters and the underlying lands. 93 As demonstrated by Lyon,
problems caused by obstructions and development also arise in litigation involving inland waters. Non-tidal, navigable waters, however,
also are subject to a type of interference that does not involve the underlying land: the reduction of the quantity of water in the stream or
lake through diversions for consumptive use. Reductions in the quantity of water in a navigable stream or lake sufficient to make it unsuitable
for aquatic life, navigation, recreation, or scenic and ecological uses
eventually will destroy the quality of the water resources. Thus, the
danger to the watercourse from diversions appears similar to that
sought to be avoided by the imposition of a public trust over navigable
waters.

94

While it has long been recognized that the public's right to these
95
instream uses are paramount to private rights to obstruct such uses,
no California case has applied directly the public trust doctrine to prevent diversions of water that interfere with the public's use of this
water. This omission may be explained by the importance of growth
and economic expansion in California. Inland water has been vital to
that growth in a way tidelands and beds of navigable waters are not.
Without fresh water for consumptive uses, California's rapid initial development would have been impossible. During California's early development, it was considered much less important to protect public
rights to use these waters for instream purposes.9 6 Thus, as current
92. Dunning, supra note 5, at 378-96.
93. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971)
(tidelands owner prevented from filling tidelands); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d
462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970) (tideland area filled and developed for commercial, recreational, and residential purposes); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138
P. 79 (1913) (state's patentees desired to reclaim land to be used for agriculture). See generally Dunning, supra note 5, at 358-59.
94. "While consumptive water rights themselves have not yet been impaired by the
assertion of the public trust doctrine, there is nothing in theory to prevent it." SCHNEIDER,
supra note 5, at 27; see also Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation
Power and the Rule ofNo Compensation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 64-65, 74-75 (1963).
95. People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 P. 374 (1897) (depositing debris in
river that obstructs public instream use violates public rights); People v. Gold Run Ditch &
Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884) (defendant's deposits of mining debris were unauthorized impairment of public right of navigation); People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal.
App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971) (fencing off a stream from the public inconsistent
with public trust protection).
96. "Specifically, the recognition of rights to the flow of the stream apart from a con-

January 1982]

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

water laws were developing, it was in the interest of Californians to
design a water law system to provide for the greatest consumption and
use of water in building the state. Because there seemed to be an abundant supply, the early lawmakers predominantly were concerned with
moving available water into new areas for development. Most California public trust litigation, however, has involved coastal areas, where
the water is unsuitable for consumptive purposes. 97 Thus, public trust

law and water law developed separately and with different emphases.
Only in recent years have an increasing number of Californians realized that the current method of water allocation is detrimental to the
preservation of natural resources.
The California Water System
Public trust law and the California water system developed separately and reflected different public needs. In California, the public
trust doctrine originally was used to protect only coastal water areas,
but later evolved to protect a broad spectrum of instream, nonconsumptive uses of all navigable waters by prohibiting private ownership
or use interfering with the public easements. 98 Conversely, California
water law has focused on protecting private, consumptive uses of water
necessary to the development of the state.99 The basic difference in
emphasis caused California public trust law and water law to follow
widely divergent paths in providing for the public interest.
The arid conditions prevailing in much of California necessitate
distribution of water for municipal and agricultural development. 00 In
the early days of California's statehood, however, the state legislature
unwittingly impeded the maximum and most efficient distribution of
water by adopting the common law riparian rights doctrine as the principal water rights doctrine in California. 0 1 Riparian rights accord to
the owner of land contiguous to a watercourse the right to use that
sumptive use and the confinement of rights to the ownership of land along a stream were
thought to be detrimental to the development of this region." Tarlock, Appropriationfor
Instream Flow Maintenance: A ProgressReport on "Wew" Public Western Water Rights,
1978 UTAH L. REV. 211, 212.
97. Dunning, supra note 5, at 359.
98. See notes 45-91 & accompanying text supra.
99. For basic references on California water law, see WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (R.
Clark ed. 1967); SELECTED PROBLEMS, supra note 2; HUTCHINS, supra note 2; MEYERS &
TARLOCK,supra note 34; M. ARCHIBALD, APPROPRIATIVE WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA,
(Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law Staff Paper No. 1, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as ARCHIBALD].
100. See note I supra.
101. When California was admitted to the Union, the legislature passed an act adopting
the common law of England as the rule of decision in all courts of the state. 1850 Cal. Stat.
ch. 95, at 219 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 (West 1954)). Although many
legislators were unaware that the common law included the riparian doctrine of water rights,
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water on the land. 0 2 A riparian's use of water for irrigation and other
consumptive purposes is limited to an amount reasonably required by
the owner; the amount's reasonableness is determined in relation to
that amount required by all other owners riparian to the watercourse. 0 3 Under this theory, no right exists to use water for purposes
unconnected with the contiguous land. 1°4
The discovery of gold in California led to the invocation of the
appropriation doctrine.10 5 Because there was no organized government
and few riparian interests in the mining regions, the gold miners established a rule of "first in time, first in right" regarding both their mining
claims and the allocation of surface waters used to wash their ore. '06 In
1855, the California Supreme Court approved this rule, 01 7 thus forging
the fundamental principles of prior appropriation. Under the appropriation doctrine, an appropriative right is acquired by the first person
who takes possession of unappropriated water by diverting it and applying it to a reasonable use for a beneficial purpose. 10 8 The right exists without regard to ownership of land contiguous to the watercourse
and continues so long as the water continues to be used beneficially. 10 9
Although it was widely contended that the riparian doctrine was
inappropriate for California's semi-arid conditions," I0 the courts did
not apply the appropriation doctrine to disputes between potential appropriators and riparian landowners."' Because of the legislature's
early adoption of the riparian doctrine," 12 riparian rights were adjudged superior to those of appropriators. Thus, the riparian doctrine was
held to entitle the riparian owner to use all the water of a stream, even
this doctrine was thereby incorporated as part of California's water law. W. BEAN, CALIFORNIA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 278 (1968).
102. HUTCHINS, supra note 2, at 40.

103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 41.
106. See ARCHIBALD, supra note 99, at 4.
107. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146-47 (1855).
108. HUTCHINS, supra note 2, at 40.
109. Id. See text accompanying notes 133-38 infra.
110. See Miller, Shaping California Water Law, 1781 to 1928, 55 SOUTHERN CAL. Q. 9,
21-25 (Spring 1973).
111. In Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886), the California Supreme Court
firmly established the riparian doctrine as fundamental in the water law of California. The
appropriative principle was not rejected, but privately owned riparian lands had water rights
superior to those of later appropriators. Although riparian rights were subject to the priority
of earlier appropriations on public lands, an appropriation on privately owned land was
subordinate to the rights of subsequent riparian patentees. See Craig, California Water Law
in Perspective, in 68 WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES, WATER CODE LXV, LXXII
(1971).
112. See note 101 supra.
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wastefully, without regard to the needs of an appropriator.11 3 In a dispute between two riparian landowners, a standard of reasonable use
was applied;" 4 in a dispute between a riparian landowner and one who
held appropriative rights, however, no such standard was applied." 5
Dominance of the riparian doctrine threatened large scale appropriators, including power companies who were developing hydroelectric
projects to
projects, and cities, such as Los Angeles, which initiated
6
bring water from sources hundreds of miles away."
The potential threat to these projects resulted in a constitutional
amendment proposed in 1927 by the state legislature. Article X, section 2117 of the California Constitution, approved by the voters in 1928,
was designed to subject all water rights in California to reasonable and
113. See Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 124, 211 P. 11 (1922): "Obviously, there is no
question of reasonable use in the sense in which that term is applied to the rights of respective riparian owners since a riparian owner, as against a nonriparian owner, is entitled to the
full flow of the stream without the slightest diminution." Id. at 132, 211 P. at 11; see also
Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal & Irrig. Co., 155 Cal. 59, 64, 99 P. 502, 512 (1909).
114. See note 103 & accompanying text supra.
115. A controversy ensued after the court's decision in Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P.
674 (1886), see note 111 supra, culminating in the passage of the Water Commission Act in
1913. 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, at 1012. The Act covered surface waters only and established
the doctrine of appropriation as the paramount rule of water law in the state by modifying
and limiting the character of riparian rights. See generaly Weil, The Pending Water Amendment to the CaliforniaConstitution, and PossibleLegislation, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 169 (1928).
The California Supreme Court, however, soon set aside the important passages of the Act
and upheld the supremacy of riparian rights. See Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison
Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 606 (1926). The court declared that riparian rights were a vested
property right and that "neither a court nor the legislature has the right to say that because
such water may be more beneficially used by others it may be freely taken from them." Id.
at 101, 252 P. at 615.
116. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
117. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (formerly CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3) provides in part:
"[B]ecause of the conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest
exent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such
waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in
the interest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the
use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State...
shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use
to be served, and such right. . . shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use
or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water. Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much of
the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently with this section, for the
purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adaptable, in view of such
reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, however, that nothing herein contained
shall be construed as depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of water
of the stream to which his land is riparian under reasonable methods of diversion
and use, or of depriving any appropriator of water to which he is lawfully entitled."
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beneficial use requirements and to prohibit the waste of water.' 18 It
ended the dominance of the riparian doctrine by requiring riparians to
establish reasonable needs and beneficial purposes before they could
use water to the exclusion of appropriators.' 19 By requiring that "the
water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent
of which they are capable,"' 20 the amendment encouraged appropriations of water by private interests. The increasing requirements for
water inthe vast arid regions of the state have resulted in the dominance of appropriative rights in California.' 2 1
Administration of Surface Water Appropriations
Before passing the constitutional amendment, however, the legislature recognized the potential impact of private appropriations on the
water supply, and had established a comprehensive administrative system for the regulation and control of appropriative surface water
rights. 122 Beginning in 1914, those who sought new appropriations of
water were required to seek approval from the Water Commission,
23
predecessor of the State Water Resources Control Board (Board).
118. See Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 367-68, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (1935)
(analysis and summary of the declarations of the amendment).
119. In Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal & Irrig. Co., 155 Cal. 59, 99 P. 502 (1909), the
court refused to limit the rights of riparian owners, charging that any such action would be a
taking of property and that "no consideration of policy can justify the taking of private
property without compensation." Id. at 65, 99 P. at 512. The amendment, however, has
been defended against claims that, by modifying riparian rights in California, it in effect
constituted an unconstitutional taking of those rights. See Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa
Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1909) (holding that the constitutional amendment is a valid
exercise of the police power of the state).
120. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
121. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 11; Dunning, supra note 5, at 358. The massive
diversions of water likely to interfere with public uses of navigable lakes and streams typically occur pursuant to an appropriative water right. Riparian rights entitle landowners
only to the natural flow of the stream. Because this flow must be used on riparian parcels, it
is unlikely that the aggregate of diversions pursuant to riparian rights on a particular stream
will interfere with public nonconsumptive uses. For a discussion of other water rights existing in California law, such as pueblo rights, groundwater rights, and prescriptive rights,
see HUTCHINS, supra note 2.
122. Water Commission Act, 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, at 1012. The Act established a
procedure by which appropriations from surface water and subterranean streams could be
regulated. Id. § 42, at 1033. This system was incorporated into the California Water Code,
enacted in 1943. Act of May 13, 1943, 1943 Cal. Stat. ch. 368, at 1604; see ARCHIBALD, supra
note 99, at 10 n.30.
123. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. Appropriative rights acquired before 1914
are not subject to the regulatory procedure established by the Act. Before 1914, appropriative rights could be obtained simply by diverting water and applying it to a beneficial use.
See id. at 17. Thus, unless an appropriator has voluntarily complied with filing provisions
in the Water Code, pre-1914 appropriations are not recorded. Id. at 18. This situation has
been criticized as causing uncertainty and, therefore, inefficiency in the California water
allocation scheme. Id. at 12.
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Initially, this agency had no discretion to refuse a procedurally correct
application for appropriative rights. 24 As the limits of available water
resources were recognized, the procedures were modified, and the
agency was given greater discretion to refuse applications detrimental
to the public welfare. 125
Today, the Board is required to consider both instream and consumptive needs in determining the allocation of water and to deny any
applications not in the public interest. 12 6 Authorized to exercise the
adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the state in the field of water
resources, the Board must allocate appropriative rights in accordance
water must be used to satisfy the greatwith the policy that all available
127
est number of beneficial uses.
A license to appropriate may contain conditions of use and is only
"effective for such time as the water actually appropriated under it is
used for a useful and beneficial purpose."'128 The conditional nature of
appropriative rights to water reflects the fundamental principle of California's water system that water rights are usufructuary rather than
proprietary.129 Rather than conveying ownership of the corpus of
to
water, water rights grant the rightholder a limited right of use subject
30
the paramount public interest in the use of all water in the state.'
The premise underlying this limitation is that the state, through
the Board, retains continuing regulatory jurisdiction over water rights
to ensure the maximum benefit to the public from the limited water
supply. In accordance with this principle, the Board has the power to
124. The discretionary authority of the Water Commission was limited to determining
whether there was unappropriated water. If there was, and an individual filed an application according to the procedures specified, a permit had to be issued. Tulare Water Co. v.
State Water Comm'n, 187 Cal. 533, 536, 202 P. 874, 876 (1921).
125. Act of Apr. 25, 1917, 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 133, at 194; see ARCHIBALD, supra note 99,
at 12. In 1921, the Commission was given the power to condition grants of water rights. Act
of May 18, 1921, 1921 Cal. Stat. ch. 329, at 443.
126. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 105, 1243, 1243.5, 1253-1255, 1257 (West 1971). Under this
system, those wishing to appropriate surface waters must apply to the Board for a permit.
See Id. §§ 1225, 1250. After conducting a hearing in which all interested parties are entitled
to participate, id. §§ 1330, 1350, the Board is authorized to issue a permit if it determines
that the proposed water use is "reasonable and beneficial" and in the "public interest." id.
§§ 1255, 1257. The Board, however, may attach conditions to the permit to protect against
future interferences with the public interest by the appropriator. Id. § 1253. After a permit
is issued, the applicant has a conditional right to appropriate water and apply it to beneficial
use. See ARcHImALD, supra note 99, at 24. Once the applicant has constructed diversion
works and begun appropriating water, he or she may then apply to the Board for a license to
appropriate. After investigating the permittee's diversion methods and water use, the Board

may issue a license. CAL. WATER CODE § 1605 (West 1971).
127. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 174, 1050 (West 1971).
128. Id. § 162.
129. See HuTcHiNs, supra note 2, at 36-37.
130. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 102, 1253 (West 1971); HtrrcmNs, supra note 2, at 37.
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investigate any charges that water is being wasted or unreasonably
used.13 ' If the Board determines that the water is being misused for
any reason, including changed conditions or changed public perceptions regarding the propriety of use, the Board may modify or extinguish the offending permit or license. 32 Thus, by placing initial and
continuing control over appropriations in the Board and by requiring
the Board to heed current public attitudes, the state legislature has established a flexible system capable of meeting changing public needs.
The "Reasonable and Beneficial Use" Test
The 1928 constitutional amendment limited riparians' rights by
imposing a reasonable and beneficial use requirement over their rights
to water. 33 Although the motivating force in adopting the amendment
was the need to prevent the unreasonable exercise of riparian rights, the
California Supreme Court has applied the reasonable and beneficial
use requirement to situations other than those involving disputes between riparians and appropriators, thus establishing that the reasonable, beneficial use provision of the amendment applies "to the use of
all water under whatever right the use may be enjoyed."1 34 The determination of what uses are reasonable and beneficial is therefore of
great importance in California water law. Eschewing precise cataloging of such uses, California courts have recognized that this concept
involves weighing relative uses and have considered what constitutes
35
reasonable and beneficial use on a case-by-case basis.'
The constitutional reasonable and beneficial use requirement imposes two distinct tests. Under the "beneficial use" test, the specific
needs of the appropriator are evaluated to determine whether the proposed use is beneficial to society.' 36 Under the "reasonable use" test,
the appropriator's needs are measured in relation to competing needs
37
to ascertain which of the competing uses is most beneficial to society. 1
131. CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 1971) requires that the Board take "all appropriate
proceedings. . . to prevent waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water in this State."
132. A license may be revoked for unreasonable use of water. 23 CAL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 764.12 (1979).
133. See notes 117-19 & accompanying text supra.
134. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 367, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (1935); see also
Lodi v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936) (between appropriators
only); Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrig. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935)
(between riparians only).
135. "What is a beneficial use, of course, depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case ...." Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrig. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567,
45 P.2d 972, 1006 (1935).
136. Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 143, 429 P.2d 889, 896-97, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 377, 384-85 (1967); see HUTCHINS, supra note 2, at 228.
137. See, e.g., People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App.
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Thus, the "beneficial use" test focuses only on the appropriator's needs,

while the "reasonable use" test focuses on the138appropriator's needs in

relation to those of other users and interests.
The California Water Code expressly recognizes some beneficial
uses and establishes priorities among them. The use of water for do-

mestic purposes is given the highest priority, followed by use for irrigation. 139 The Code also provides that a municipality's right to acquire
and hold rights to water for both existing and future uses shall be "pro-

tected to the fullest extent necessary." 140 Although these provisions delineate a water system with established priorities in favor of municipal
and agricultural development, these uses are circumscribed by the re-

quirements of the reasonable use doctrine.' 4 ' In applying the reasonable use test, the Board must weigh and balance the relative social

values of all beneficial uses, and grant an appropriative right only when
a certain use would best serve the public interest. 14 2
Among the beneficial uses the Code requires the Board to consider
are "the use of water for recreation and preservation and enhancement
of fish and wildlife resources."' 143 Thus, the Board specifically is re-

quired to consider environmental factors in granting permits to use

water. 144 All state agencies, including the Board, are required by the

California Environmental Quality Act 145 to consider the need for

3d 743, 750-51, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 856-57 (1976) (direct diversion from Napa River for frost
protection of grapevines was unreasonable use because simultaneous demand from all
viniculturists could exhaust water supply of river). See generally HUrCHINS, supra note 2, at
228.
138. See SELECTED PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 317.
139. CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 1971).
140. Id. § 106.5.
141. Id. § 100. Because the limits imposed by the reasonableness doctrine remain a
question of fact in each case, substantial changes in public opinion about the reasonableness
of the quantity of a diversion may be reflected in allocation decisions. See generally HUTCHINS, supra note 2, at 228.
142. See note 126 & accompanying textsupra. CAL. WATER CODE § 106.5 (West 1971),
which limits municipal rights by prohibiting municipal appropriations in excess of reasonable and existing needs, is an example of the fundamental and overriding role of the reasonableness and beneficial use doctrine.
143. CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1971).
144. Judicial decisions have also established the protection of the environment as a reasonable and beneficial use. E.g., City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 474-75,
52 P.2d 585, 592 (1935) (reasonable, beneficial use of water includes "maintenance of a lake
level with the attractive surroundings and the recreational opportunities and increased land
values thereby afforded"); see also City of Elsinore v. Temescal Water Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d
116, 129-30, 97 P.2d 274, 280 (1939). Although Alken attributed this result to the riparian
rights doctrine, one commentator suggests that the recognition of these uses was consistent
with the theory underlying the public trust doctrine. Johnson, supra note 5, at 260. But see
Downey, L.4. ' Water Rights Go Back 40 Years, WESTERN WATER 7 (Sept.-Oct. 1979).
145. CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21076 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

"clean air and water," 1 46 and to "prevent the elimination of fish or
wildlife species." 147 Thus, the Board must fully consider each proposed
appropriation in light of a number of factors and alternatives, including the instream and environmental uses that are also protected under
the public trust doctrine.
A History of Diversions and Conflict
The Mono Lake Dispute
Mono Lake lies 340 miles northeast of Los Angeles on the eastern
slope of the Sierra Nevada. It is fed by five freshwater creeks, four of
which are partly diverted to Los Angeles by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. In 1913, the city constructed the Los Angeles Aqueduct, and began diverting water through it from the Owens
River, located 200 miles northeast of Los Angeles. When it became
feasible to tap the Sierra runoff flowing into the independent Mono
Basin, the city extended the aqueduct north into the basin. In the
1960's, Los Angeles constructed a second aqueduct to divert water from
the Mono Basin. This aqueduct, which began operating in June 1970,
increased the system's yield by fifty percent. 148 Since 1970, the city has
diverted an average of 100,000 acre feet of water yearly from149the lake,
resulting in the accelerated decline of the lake's water level.
With a long history and unique mineral composition, Mono Lake
146. Id. § 21001(b).
147. Id. § 21001(c). One commentator has noted that the Act can affect instream uses in
two ways: "It is a legislative guideline for determining what is in the public interest. And, it

requires that regulatory agencies not approve projects where there are feasible ways to substantially lessen environmental damage of proposed projects." SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at

107. Other legislative acts protecting instream uses include the California Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5093.50-.65 (West Supp. 1981), and the California
Protected Waterways Act, 1968 Cal. Stat. ch. 1278, at 2403. See generally SCHNEIDER, supra
note 5, at 88-106.
148. See Los ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER, Los ANGELES WATER
RIGHTS IN THE MONO BASIN AND THE IMPACT OF THE DEPARTMENT'S OPERATIONS ON

MONO LAKE 1-9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MONO BASIN]. Two factors led to the Depart-

ment's decision to increase diversions. The first was the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1962), which established the amounts of water Arizona,
California, and Nevada could divert from the Colorado River, significantly reducing California's previous use of that water. Second, in 1959, the State Water Board requested that
Los Angeles indicate whether it intended to use the full amount of water assigned to it under
the original permits or to accept a license limited to the amounts then being diverted. See
MONO BASIN, supra, at 8. Thus, the Department was forced either to enlarge its export
facilities or to lose part of its rights to export Mono Lake waters. See Lane, Inyo County
FilesSuit Against Los Angeles Departmentof Water andPower, in DEEPEST VALLEY 220 (G.

Smith ed. 1978).
149. CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, REPORT OF INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ON MONO LAKE 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
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is a laboratory for geologists and other scientists.

50

Negit Island, one

of two volcanic islands rising from the middle of the lake, was California's largest single nesting colony for California gulls. Until 1978,
ninety-five percent of the state's population of California guls nested
on Negit Island each year. In addition to the gulls, an estimated eighty
percent of the world's eared grebes visit the lake each year, along with
approximately thirty-five percent of the world's population of Wilson's
on brine shrimp and
phaloropes. These birds live almost exclusively
15
brine flies, which abound at the lake. '
Los Angeles's diversions have decreased the lake's water level significantly. The original diversions from the streams feeding the lake
caused the water level to drop 1.1 feet per year. In 1971, when annual
exports from the basin were increased by fifty percent, however, the
decline in the lake's water level accelerated to its present average rate
of 1.6 feet annually. As a result, Negit Island has become the tip of a
peninsula, providing coyotes and other predators access to the birds'
nests. While some attempts have been made to protect the birds, the
island has ceased to be a refuge for them. 152 Even if continued efforts
to protect the birds from predators are successful, however, the shrink-

ing of the lake poses another threat to their existence because of a
dwindling supply of food. As the volume of water decreases in the
lake, the concentration of salt increases. Most scientists agree that at
some point the lake will become too saline for shrimp, flies, or algae to
survive. When this happens, the birds that have been migrating to
Mono Lake will no longer be able to survive there. 153
See generally MONO BASIN RESEARCH GROUP, AN ECOLOGICAL STUDY OF MONO
(D. Winkler ed. 1977) (Institute of Ecology Publication No. 12, Univ. of
Cal., Davis).
151. See generally Rowell, Mono Lake: silent, sadless,shrinkingsea, 80 AUDUBON 102
(1978); Steinhart, The City and the Inland Sea, 82 AUDUBON 98 (1980).
152. See generaly TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 1-8. In 1976, 1977, and
1978, an average of 33,000 gulls nested on Negit Island. The California National Guard
tried in both 1978 and 1979 to blast a channel between the islands and the mainland. The
Guard's blasting was unsuccessful, and during the breeding season of 1979, no gulls nested
on Negit. Chasan, Mono Lake v. LosAngeles: a tug-f-warforprelouswater, 11 SMrrHsoNIAN 42,48 (Feb. 1981). Before the 1980 breeding season began, the California Department
of Fish and Game attempted another physical solution by installing a $66,000 chain link
fence that completely blocked off the peninsula. The fence was successful in keeping
predators off the island but no birds nested on Negit that year. Instead, they moved to the
smaller islands in the lake. Id.
153. See MONO BASIN RESEARCH GROUP, AN ECOLOGICAL STUDY OF MONO LAKE,
CALIFORNIA 61 (D. Winkler ed. 1977) (Institute of Ecology Publication No. 12, Univ. of
Cal., Davis). Ninety-seven percent of the baby gulls in the spring hatch of 1981 now have
died, apparently because the adult birds were unable to find sufficient amounts of brine
shrimp to feed their young. This latest situation caught both conservationists and city water
officials by surprise because laboratory tests suggested that the shrimp could tolerate those
levels. Research at the lake, however, showed that the first hatch of the brine shrimp had
fallen to ten percent of past levels. David Gaines, head of the Mono Lake Committee, noted
150.

LAKE, CALIFORNIA
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Those who favor of limiting diversions from Mono Lake do not
believe that Los Angeles needs the amount of water it extracts. 54 They
are supported in their claims by the report of an interagency task force,
organized by the California Department of Water Resources and composed of governmental agencies having management responsibilities in
the Mono Basin. In 1979, the task force recommended a plan that
would reduce Los Angeles's diversions by eighty-five percent, and thus
maintain an average lake level of 6,388 feet above sea level, about 72
feet above the present level. This reduction is the amount necessary for
the lake level to stabilize, thereby covering the land bridge to Negit
Island and reducing the salinity in the lake. Supporters of this plan
claim that if minor water conservation measures were functioning in
55
Los Angeles by 1985, this lake level could be achieved.
Although the plan is widely supported by those concerned with
saving Mono Lake, the Department of Water and Power objects to the
plan as unrealistic and has blocked legislation designed to implement
it. 156 The Department claims that a reduction in or elimination of the
diversions from Mono Lake would be disastrous to Los Angeles. Because eighteen to twenty percent of the city's water supply comes from
the Mono Basin, the Department argues that the diversions are essential to a water system already threatened by substantial reductions in
available supplies. 5 7 Los Angeles contends that the economic and enthat, if the first hatch of brine shrimp continues to succumb to the increasing salinity of the
lake, "there's no hope for the future of the gulls, and. . . the other birds who use the lake
during migration and eat brine shrimp will be forced elsewhere." L.A. Times, July 22, 1981,
pt. II, at 3; see also L.A. Times, July 28, 1981, pt. I, at 16.
Whether the migratory birds can go elsewhere, however, is in doubt. Aquatic habitat is
scarce in the arid region of western North America. The lakes nearest to Mono Lake capable of sustaining the water birds that migrate across the Great Basin are Albert Lake, 300
miles to the north, Salton Sea, 350 miles to the south, and Great Salt Lake, 400 miles to the
east. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 163, at 17. "Thus, migrant birds presently relying on
Mono Lake will be faced with increased migratory flights if Mono Lake loses its capacity to
fill their needs. All physiological knowledge argues that the decline of the Mono Lake
habitat will substantially reduce population of these migratory birds." Id. at 19; see also
Steinhart, The City and the Inland Sea, 82 AUDUBON 98, 103 (1980).
154. See Chasan, Mono Lake v. Los Angeles: a tug-of-warforprecious wafer, 11 SMIThSONIAN 42, 48 (Feb. 1981).
155. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 149, at 45-52. In addition to the reduction in
Los Angeles's diversions, the plan recommended by the Task Force, Plan P, would require
Los Angeles to purchase additional city water from the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California until water conservation measures are implemented. Id. at 47.
156. See Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Minority Report by Los Angeles
on the Draft Final Report of the Mono Lake Task Force (July 27, 1979) (on file with the
Hastings Law Journal).
157. Id. at 2. The Department claims that all limitation proposals fail to consider the
reliability of the alternate sources of water available to Los Angeles and that implementation of such proposals will result in mandatory and severe water rationing in Los Angeles. It
further asserts that southern California will lose over one half of its Colorado River supply
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vironmental costs associated with replacing the Mono Basin water far
exceed the benefits to be reaped from limiting the diversions. 158 The
Department thus asserts that Los Angeles's survival will not allow the
preservation of birds and the Mono Basin environment to outweigh the
consumptive use of water resources in the Mono Basin.
Unification: The Public Trust Requirements of California

Water Law
The plight facing Mono Lake illustrates the dangers threatening
California's surface water resources partly as a result of the Board's
failure to protect public trust rights when allocating state waters. To
preserve these resources, the Board should adequately consider both
consumptive and instream uses of water before granting appropriative
rights. This protection could be provided if the Board were required to
make water allocation decisions in accordance with both California
water law and the public trust doctrine.
Under the present system, the Board is required to weigh all reasonable and beneficial uses of the water resource and to grant a right to
appropriate only when the use urged would best serve the public interest. 159 While some instream rights traditionally protected under the
public trust doctrine are among those uses deemed reasonable and beneficial,160 the historically favorable attitude towards consumptive use
and the priorities found in California water law favoring consumptive
over instream uses have significantly influenced Board decisions. As a
result, the Board has consistently granted and upheld against challenge
appropriative rights impairing or even destroying instream rights. 16 1
While a consumptive use of water is often a proper use of the resource,
by conferring undue priority on consumptive interests the Water Board
has failed to account for the growing public concern in preserving
streams and lakes for instream uses.' 62 Furthermore, as it now operin 1985 and that Los Angeles's claim to the remaining half is uncertain because of challenges
by other groups. Because of the further uncertainty surrounding the authorization of the
proposed peripheral canal, which has yet to pass a statewide referendum, the Department
claims that reliable sources of future water supplies are actually half the amount already
committed by the Department. Id. at 3.
158. As water flows from Mono Basin down to Los Angeles almost entirely by gravity, it
propels hydroelectric power plants. The transportation of alternative sources of water to Los
Angeles would require the consumption of energy, thereby causing added pollution and
expense. Id at 2.
159. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 105, 1243, 1243.5, 1253-1255, 1257 (West 1971). See
notes 141-43 & accompanying text supra.
160. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1971).
161. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 100-01.
162. "Critics of our water rights law also note that while great emphasis has been given
to rights to divert water from streams, aside from the few streams covered by the Wild and
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ates, California's water law system does not force the Board to accord

163
public trust rights their proper weight in the allocation process.
The legal battle over Mono Lake began in 1979 when a coalition
of environmental groups filed a complaint requesting an injunction to
64

limit further diversions by the Department of Water and Power.l
Neither of the proposals offered by the opposing parties in the Mono
Lake litigation requires the Board to give adequate consideration of
instream rights in making allocation decisions, and therefore neither

proposal solves the problems created by Board decisions that disregard
public rights to instream water uses.
Applying the public trust doctrine, the plaintiffs argued that public

rights, safeguarded by the public trust doctrine, are superior to the
rights of appropriators, and that these public rights include the right to
preserve a sufficient flow of water to Mono Lake to maintain the lake at
a level necessary to the public's use.1 65 They interpreted California
Fish and City of Berkeley as forbidding Department diversions that
impair public trust uses on Mono Lake unless the Department obtains
166
a legislative grant expressly alienating the trust over Mono Lake.
Requiring the state legislature to act upon all Board decisions having
potential impact on public trust rights, however, would usurp the
Board's control of state surface waters and would impair the efficient

functioning of both the legislature and the Board. Requiring the legislature to pass upon each water allocation decision that might have an
Scenic Rivers Act, little attention in practice has been paid to the protection of instream
beneficial uses." Id. at 12.
163. Although the present system requires the Board to consider instream rights traditionally protected under public trust theory, the restrictions on such considerations imposed
by CaiforniaFish and its progeny are absent from this system. For an explanation of how
full public trust protection would ensure sincere and thorough consideration of instream
values in Board decisions, see text accompanying notes 172-76 infra.
164. Complaint, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water and Power, No. 6429
(Super. Ct. Mono County, Cal. filed May 21, 1979). The procedural history of the Mono
Lake litigation is discussed in note 9 supra.
165. Proposed Pretrial Statement at 1-5, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of
Water and Power, Civ. No. 566 (Super. Ct. Alpine County, Cal. filed Dec. 7, 1979). The
plaintiffs argued that no such grant exists to give the Department the power to interfere with
public trust rights because, at the time the Department's permit to appropriate from Mono
Lake was issued, the Board failed to consider these rights. Therefore, the plaintiffs argued,
the Department has no right to its present level of diversions, and it may exercise its rights of
ownership only if those rights do not interfere with the public's easements over Mono Lake.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Abstention at 26, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of
Water and Power, Civ. No. 5-80-127 (E.D. Cal. March 2, 1981). The preservation of the
public's trust rights in Mono Lake would require an 85% reduction in diversions. See note
155 & accompanying text supra.
166. Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Abstention at 26, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water and Power, Civ. No. 5-80-127 (E.D. Cal. March 2, 1981).
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adverse effect would be cumbersome and would result in unacceptably

long delays in reaching decisions.
The Department of Water and Power and its codefendants, the
State of California, the State Lands Commission, and the State Water

Resources Control Board, 167 argued that the 1928 constitutional
amendment, by subjecting all water rights in California to reasonable
and beneficial use requirements, effectively precludes independent pub-

lic trust protection of instream uses in navigable waters.' 68 These defendants asserted that the doctrines currently governing water use in
California successfully regulate all claims to use water, and, for reasons
of efficiency and stability, must remain the exclusive theories upon

which water rights are predicated. 69 Thus, they imply that any challenge to Board allocation decisions must be based on asserted violations of the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine rather than upon
public trust theory. 170 The superior court apparently accepted the de-

fendants' arguments. In granting the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, the court stated:
The California water rights system is a comprehensive and exclusive
system for determining the legality of the diversions of the City of
Los Angeles in the Mono Basin. Any use of appropriated water is
The
subject to and conditional upon the statutory procedure ....
Public Trust doctrine does not function independently of that system.
This Court concludes that as regards the right of the City of Los
Angeles to divert waters in the Mono Basin that the Public 7Trust
1
Doctrine is subsumed in the water rights system of the state.'

As ineffectual as the plaintiff's proposal is, the proposal made by the
defendants and accepted by the superior court would merely retain the

present allocation scheme while remedying none of its failings, because
167. After the original complaint in this litigation was filed, the Department joined as
defendants the State of California, the State Lands Commission, the State Water Resources
Control Board, and the United States. See note 9 supra. The state defendants and the Department presented basically the same arguments for denial of plaintiffs' claims. The United
States filed separate briefs in the case, asserting arguments similar to those presented in this
Comment. See United States Closing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant State of California's Motion for Summary Judgment, National Audubon
Soe'y v. Department of Water and Power, Civ. No. 639 (Super. Ct. Alpine County, Cal.,
Sept. 8, 1981).
168. Department of Water and Power's Memorandum of Points and Authdritiesin Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-14; State Defendants' Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment at 9, 13-17, National Audubon Soe'y v. Department of Water and Power, Civ. No. 639 (Super. Ct. Alpine County, Cal.,
Sept. 8, 1981).
169. Department of Water and Power's Memorandum at 19-21; State Defendants'
Memorandum at 17-21.
170. See Department of Water and Powers Memorandum at 19-21; State Defendants'
Memorandum at 17-21.
171. National Audubon Soe'y v. Department of Water and Power, Civ. No. 639, slip op.
at I (Super Ct. Alpine County, Cal. Sept. 8, 1981).
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the Board is not required to give the public trust due consideration in
its decisionmaking process.
A better alternative than these proposals would be to incorporate
public trust protection into the existing water rights system. Integrating
the public trust and reasonable and beneficial use doctrines within one
administrative scheme would impose a dual responsibility on the
Board. This proposed dual responsibility would require that the Board
take into account the powers and obligations imposed upon the legislature by the public trust doctrine with regard to surface waters along
with evaluating reasonable and beneficial uses of water. Thus, under
this proposal, no grant of water rights could be made by the Board
before the requirements of both doctrines are fully satisfied.
In this unified system, Board decisions would still be governed by
the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine. California public trust law,
however, would impose stricter guidelines on the Board's decisionmaking process in instances in which a proposed use could significantly
impair or destroy trust rights in the water resource. Thus, the Board
would still be required to determine that an appropriation would best
serve the public interest,172 but under the authority of CaliforniaFish, it
would then be required to express this determination along with its intention to alienate trust rights before granting an appropriative right
that interferes with a trust right. 173 Such grants should, in addition, be
subject to the size and specificity requirements established in Eldridge v.
Cowell and its progeny. 174 Finally, and most importantly, Board decisions to alienate trust rights in favor of consumptive water uses would
be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Any doubts regarding an absolute
conveyance would be resolved against alienation and private rights
75
granted under invalid conveyances would defer to public trust rights.
Under the proposed sytem, therefore, the Board would be required to
evaluate, and if possible, to refrain from making water allocation decisions that would have adverse effects on public trust interests. If the
Board failed to express its intention to alienate the trust over a specific
watercourse, the trust would remain intact and any rights granted by
the conveyance would remain subject to and limited by the entire spec172. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 105, 1253, 1256, 1257 (West 1971).
173. CaiforniaFish held that the legislature's intent to alienate the trust "must be clearly
expressed or necessarily implied." 166 Cal. at 597, 138 P. at 88.

174. See notes 47-50 & accompanying text supra.
175. "[S]tatutes [or, under this proposal, Board decisions] purporting to authorize an
abandonment of. . . public use will be carefully scanned to ascertain whether or not such
was the legislative intention. . . . [Such intent] will not be implied if any other inference is
reasonably possible." People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 597, 138 P. at 88 (emphasis
added); see also City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 528, 606 P. 2d 362, 369,
162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 334, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
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176
truim of public trust easements.

The Effect of the 1928 Amendment on the Public Trust
Doctrine
177
In NationalAudubon Society v. Departmentof Water andPower,
the trial court apparently accepted the defendants' argument that the
constitutional mandate subjecting all water rights to reasonable and
beneficial use requirements and the establishment of a comprehensive
plan to administer water rights in accordance with that mandate by the
state legislature indicates that the public trust doctrine is "subsumed"
within California water law. 178 In substance, the defendants argued
that the 1928 constitutional amendment superseded and thereby terminated public trust protection in the water rights allocation process. Examination of the amendment and its legislative history, however,
reveals little evidence that the amendment was intended to replace the
public trust doctrine.
The amendment was a direct response to the restrictions placed
upon state development by the initial dominance of the riparian rights
doctrine.' 79 While the amendment, as initially introduced, proposed
the termination of riparian rights,' 80 the amendment was eventually
transformed by legislative committees into a general provision requirNo intention to terminate trust rights was exing "reasonableness."''
pressed during this time, and it is unlikely that there was an implicit
intention on the part of the legislature to alienate the public trust over
California's waters. 182 The original goal of the amendment and the ex176. See People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 598-99, 138 P. at 88. The court in
CaiforniaFish mentioned only the traditional trust easements of navigation and commerce.
Id. Recent cases, however, have broadened the range of public trust easements. See notes
68-71, 81-88 & accompanying text supra. Imposition of trust limitations on currently held
appropriative rights would check the exercise of these rights until Board decisions could be
made regarding the relative necessity of consumptive and instream uses of the water resource. If necessary, in light of the broad spectrum of recognized trust rights and beneficial
uses, further legislative guidelines could be implemented to aid the Board in this decision
process. Such guidelines, however, are not essential to the implementation of this plan.
177. Civ. No. 639 (Super. Ct. Alpine County, Cal. Sept. 8, 1981).
178. See notes 167-71 & accompanying text supra.
179. See notes 110-21 & accompanying text supra.
180. See Well, Ffty Years of Water Law, 50 H.v. L. REv. 252, 275 (1936).
181. Id.
182. Speaking before the Joint Committee of the California Senate and Assembly on
Water Resources on September 19, 1928 on the subject of the proposed constitutional
amendment, Edward Treadwell examined various methods by which the modification of
riparian rights could be justified as nonconfiscatory. Treadwell, Modernizing the Water
Law, 17 CALiF. L. REv. 1 (1928). The public trust doctrine was considered in this context.
Mr. Treadwell examined the nature of state title to navigable waters, concluding that "it
cannot be said to be without merit" that the state has a right to use these waters for navigation or other public uses. Id. at 9. Regarding this contention, he noted that "any rights of
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pressed intention of the legislature remained the same throughout: to
eliminate the unreasonable
use of water in order to conserve it for con183
sumptive purposes.
The public trust doctrine is a common law doctrine and therefore
cannot control in determining the effect of the 1928 amendment. The
requirements of the public trust doctrine, however, can be useful in
interpreting the amendment. California public trust decisions continually have affirmed that grants made pursuant to expansive and nonspecific legislative actions affecting trust lands or waters are invalid to
alienate the trust. 184 The amendment is analogous to these expansive
legislative actions; it applies "to the use of all water, under whatever
right the use may be enjoyed."' 185 Thus, as the amendment did not
expressly alienate the trust over a specific parcel or parcels of land, it is
unlikely that it was intended to terminate any trust rights.
Concurrent Administration by the Board
Although the 1928 amendment did not terminate the public trust
doctrine, independent trust protection does not require that the legislature implement its trust duties through a separate system that may conflict with and overrule water allocation decisions made under the
current process by the Board. Instead, the restrictions imposed upon
the legislature by the public trust merely require that it establish a system for the management of water capable of effectively protecting trust
resources. Consequently, a water allocation system can be designed
that will effectively and adequately integrate the current principles of
water law and the requirements of the public trust into the allocation
decisionmaking process.
Beginning with the common law modification of the Roman common ownership theory, public trust protection has imposed a duty upon
the sovereign to manage trust waters so that private rights in these resources do not interfere with public easements. Under this theory, the
public trust is not a competing water rights system or even a water right
riparian owners must be held subject to the superior right of the state." Id. at 7. Finally,
Mr. Treadwell examined the exercise of trust powers in various states, citing CaliforniaFish
for the proposition that, while state title could be conveyed in California, "the question as to
whether such rights have been granted, of course, involves many considerations of law and
fact." Id. at 8. The fact that the legislative committees considered the public trust doctrine
in developing the amendment and did not include express language of alienation so as to
satisfy the requirements of CaliforniaFish, suggests that the amendment was not intended to
supersede the public trust doctrine. Furthermore, the language of the amendment itself, see
note 117 supra, offers no support for an argument that it terminated public trust protection
of California's navigable waters.
183. See Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 700, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (1933).
184. See notes 55-65 & accompanying text supra.
185. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 367, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (1935).
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itself. The public trust is a historical responsibility imposed upon the
legislature to administer California's water resources for the public

good. This responsibility, however, does not require that the legislature
itself administer the water resources.

In creating the California water law system and establishing the
Water Board as its administrator, the state legislature has provided a

water allocation system capable of managing California's surface waters under the current water law and public trust doctrines. This system would allow the legislative and judicial overview necessary to

protect the public trust easements of navigation, fishing, recreation, and
the environment and would grant permits to water appropriators when
necessary. The amenability of the California water rights system to the
inclusion of the public trust theory is evidenced further by Water Code

provisions limiting the rights of private grantees.1 86 Under these provisions, the Board could exercise its discretionary powers in granting permits and licenses to limit possible interferences with instream values.
During the hearing phase, competing interests could be considered and
then provided for either by refusing to grant permits or licenses or by

attaching conditions to appropriative rights. With respect to permits
such as those granted for the streams flowing into Mono Lake, the

Board could exercise its continuing jurisdiction over previously granted
rights by revoking or modifying the appropriative right when it recognizes that it has exceeded the limits of the public trust doctrine.
Thus, the state permit system offers a framework that accommo-

dates and can easily incorporate public trust protection.1 87 If adequate

guidelines and procedures are provided the Board, its management of
186. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 102, 162, 275, 1253 (West 1971). See notes 127-32 &
accompanying text supra.
187. A recent North Dakota case recognizes that the public trust doctrine can be integrated with a state's water allocation system. See United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State
Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). North Dakota's water law is
similar to that of California; it developed in response to arid conditions and recognizes the
doctrine of prior appropriation. See generall, I W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN
THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 6, 520 (1971). Additionally, the North Dakota Constitution, related water law statutes, and judicial decisions provide that the waters of the state are
publicly owned and require that these resources be put to a "beneficial use to the fullest
extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable method of use of water
be prevented." Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968) (construing N.D.
CONST. art. 17, § 210, and N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01). In UnitedPlainsmen,the plaintiffs
filed suit seeking an injunction against North Dakota's water agency to prevent the issuing
of water permits for certain power and energy production facilities. The plaintiffs charged
that the agency had violated the public trust doctrine by failing to devise water conservation
plans or to consider adequately injury to the public from the proposed water uses. In interpreting the state water law requiring beneficial use, the court found the rights to all waters
mentioned in the statutes to be vested in the state as trustee for the public easements. 247
N.W.2d at 461. The court further held that the public trust doctrine permitted alienation
and allocation of state water resources by the legislatively chosen administrative agency only
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California water should fully satisfy the responsibilities imposed upon
the legislature by the reasonable and beneficial use and public trust
doctrines.

Efficient Allocation of State Waters
Section 102 of the California Water Code declares that "[a]U water

within the State is the property of the people of the State .... ,"188
Similarly, the public trust doctrine provides for public ownership of
state waters. Both the Code and the public trust doctrine recognize that
state trusteeship over waters requires the legislature to implement a
plan to administer the water resource in the public interest. 189 The
Board's duties to exercise the legislature's responsibilities in the field of
water resources should remain subject to the limitations of the public
trust doctrine. Administrative efficiency and the adverse effect of inconsistent administration of the state's waters therefore should authorize the concurrent management by the Board of California's surface
waters in accordance with both public trust and California water
law.190
after that agency made an analysis of the present supply and the future need for water. Id.
at 463.
188. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
189. The Water Code is the plan adopted by the legislature to administer appropriative
water rights under the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine. California public trust decisions have imposed a similar requirement on the legislature, requiring it to determine,
before granting absolute private rights in trust resources, that such a grant will serve the
public interest in the trust lands. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d
515, 529, 606 P.2d 362, 370, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 335, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). As the
scope of trust easements has expanded to approximate the Roman common ownership theory more closely than the limited, easement approach, see notes 66-91 & accompanying text
supra, all aspects of the public interest, including the interest in diverting water to the arid
regions of the state, may be represented in such a deliberation.
190. The original grant of power to the Board by the legislature could be interpreted as
providing this authorization. The Board is authorized to carry out the legislature's responsibilities in the field of water resources. See note 127 & accompanying text supra. This could
be interpreted as positing legislative powers, including the power of trust alienation, in the
Board. If further authorization or scrutiny of Board decisions in carrying out its dual responsibility is deemed necessary, authorization and guidance could be provided by the legislature. If such authorization is not assumed or granted, an alternative plan could require
that legislative committees, capable of carrying out the legislature's trust duties, be created to
consider and, if necessary, act upon Board decisions affecting trust rights. This proposal
would at least lessen the inefficiencies inherent in the plaintiffs' solution because the full
legislature would not have to consider each case. It is, however, less efficient than concurrent management of trust and water rights by the Board, and it is not necessary to ensure
proper, and sincere, administration of the state's trust duties. The current water system provides an administrative relief system by which challenges to Board decisions may be made.
Furthermore, judicial appeals may follow from these administrative adjudications, and
therefore Board decisions will be subject to the judicial scrutiny imposed upon state actions
involving trust rights. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
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By providing the Board with the requisite legislative authority to
alienate the public trust in times of significant water need, the express
priorities of use in the Code can be used to give precedence to domestic
and agricultural uses. 19 1 Generally, however, Water Code provisions
requiring consideration of all competing uses would entail greater consideration of alternatives, such as conservation, before granting permits
to appropriate water. A determination of the reasonableness of any
grant should require a prior determination of the extent of the interference with public trust uses. In addition, the Board should attempt to
avoid granting any permits that would interfere with the trust. While
careful judicial scrutiny of the Board's decisions may be necessary to
ensure that the Board adequately considers the public trust, this plan
92
can prevent overconsumption of water resources such as Mono Lake.1
It also will provide for the maximum beneficial use of water resources
in California.
Conclusion
The Mono Lake litigation presents an opportunity for California
courts to re-evaluate and improve current water law. It is necessary for
the courts to reconsider the propriety of allowing diversions from the
lake in light of the alternatives available to meet or lessen Los Angeles's water requirements. This suit presents the appropriate case for the
courts to establish that the Board should consider the public trust requirements in addition to the other principles of water law in making
its water allocation decisions. By recognizing and incorporating the
public trust concept into water rights decisions, the courts will continue
a tradition in California law of recognizing and responding to the public interest. This change will not cripple the current water rights system, but will cause it to reflect the concern of all California citizens for
the preservation of the state's natural resources for future generations.
Martha ujy*

191. See notes 139-40 & accompanying text supra.
192. While past grants of appropriation rights must be scrutinized, the California
Supreme Court has established that some rights, already exercised in reliance on past decisions, will be protected. In City ofBerkeley, the court limited the application of its ruling to
lands, or now, waters, still "physically adaptable for trust purposes. . . ." 26 Cal. 3d at 534,
606 P.2d at 373, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The increased consideration given public trust uses,
therefore, will not require appropriators to "refill" streams that have been dried up as a
consequence of appropriations.
* Member, Second Year Class.

